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The Haredi sociological identity Anthropological perspectives on the Israeli society
15/06/2004
It is commonly thought among Israelis that the Haredim, or the ultra orthodox Jews, are a very little minority that does not interfere at all in the modern society of the State. They are seen as religious extremists that preserve themselves in a mini-society that they have built for themselves in order to be protected and isolated from modernity understood as synonymous with secularism. They cultivate the “old” and fear the “new”. From the point of view of secular Israelis, they are often seen as a homogeneous and compact group, referred to as the “penguins” because of their traditional black suits. But are they really a homogeneous social group, with the same way of life, same ideology, and same interests?
One could think that, on the contrary, they are a very diverse group with no single identity but that has built a system of self protection against the secular world. In other words, the Haredim define themselves as a nearly homogeneous social group when confronted to the modern world.
In a first part, we will try to define the term “Haredim” and show the diversity it implies.
We will see how the Haredim define themselves, how they perceive the exterior world, and how diverse the Haredim are. Then, we will see how, beyond their divergences, the Haredim have built a kind of separate society in the heart of the Israeli State.
The Haredim are “ultra orthodox” Jews. In some circles the term “ ultra orthodox” seemed to work, and in the English speaking world it is still an efficient landmark to characterize the very religious Jewish population. However, “orthodox” is a term that comes from a language foreign to the Jewish experience ( it has been historically associated with versions of American Protestantism), and therefore, can not grasp precisely the essentials trends of the Jewish population it was meant to define. More over, strictly speaking, the term “orthodox” is not appropriate because what differs the Haredim from other Jews is not the doxa but the practices. The term “Haredim” came to avoid the ambiguities of the appellation “ultra orthodox”. The term Haredim in Hebrew literary means “fearful” implying the fear of God.
However, it is important to notice that most of these Jews do not define themselves as “Haredim”, but as simple Jews “ yidn” in Yiddish, or as “erlicher yidn”, virtuous Jews, who observe the sacred commandments. The names they use reveal that they consider themselves simply as the true Jews, not as a separate group called Haredim. They see themselves as part of an unbroken tradition begun with Avraham, Isaac and Jacob, and continued by the Sages until today. They devote their whole life to the study of the sacred texts and to prayer, constantly fearing to act in contradiction with God’s will. One of the characteristics of the Haredi population in Israel, and what distinguishes it from every other religious extremism, is its choice of isolation. It is true that almost every fundamentalist population tries to live independently from the others, to stay more or less autonomic, but the Jewish ultra orthodox community in Israel really tries to establish a separation with the rest of the people, not only ideologically, but also geographically speaking. This is due to the fear of modernity and secularization they have developed. Their entire life is devoted to deepen their own way of traditional Judaism, a process which sometimes imply a form of opposition to the “chukos hagoyim”, the laws of the Gentiles.
Haredi Judaism has developed as a reaction to the crisis of Eastern European Jewry’s in the latter half of the nineteenth century. During this period, the processes of modernization and secularisation attacked the very foundations of the traditional ways of life, within the Jewish masses. Emancipation, edicts of tolerance, political upheavals, urbanization made the Jews, especially the young generation, look above the horizons of their families, communities, and traditions. Many Jews, particularly those who moved from small villages to large cities and western, started abandoning their faith. They considered themselves as citizens, individuals able to integrate the modern society ( which does not mean that they automatically forget about their religion.) But for a lot of very religious Jews, the correlation between modernity and secularism, or even assimilation was established. At this time was born the fear and distrust the Haredim feel towards modernity. In reaction to this movement they began to separate themselves from the world, keeping their own traditions, their own way of dressing etc, the most striking separation from the rest of the population was the geographical one, which is still accurate. Until today, the Haredi Eda presents some characteristics that are meant to make a kind of frontier between their world and the modern world. They have their own language (Yiddish), their own way of dressing ( black suits), their particular behaviour, for example the strict separation between man and women. Geographically, they are implanted in specific towns, Bne Brak, for example, or in delimited corners in big cities: Mea Chaarim, Givat Shmouel… The geographer Yosef Shilav noticed that the haredi ghettos have a “ forced character” because the fear of the exterior world is so deep that no Haredi would live outside a of a haredi corner. Indeed, the representation that the Haredim have of the modern world is really scaring: according to them, in Tel Aviv, or in the kibboutzim, people have rejected God and its laws (porkei-ol), they eat impure beasts, lead a life of debauch, have unrestricted sexual lives, educate their children without any values, and try to imitate the goyims (nations). The Haredim consider that the only solution to preserve their children from any kind of influence from this perverted world is to live in ghettos where there is a high concentration of yeshivot, and where live rabbis considered as “gaonims”, sages. Those ghettos are a kind of microcosms that tend to become a global society. It encloses the lives of its members from birth to death, ruling their behaviour not only in terms of religion, but also in profane terms, their professional activity, their hobbies, etc. This let people think that there is not any link or connexion between the Haredim and the rest of the nation. In the haredi newspaper Yated Neeman, published on February 2nd 1990, this situation is analysed as follow: “ Nowadays, the Haredim and the Hilonim in Israel are two separate nations that share the same territory.”
This strict separation from the modern world explains the fact that most of the secular people do not know them, and consider that they are a compact, all look-alike group. But the frontiers that the Haredim have erected between themselves and the world just hide an overburden micro-society. One of the differences among the Haredim has existed since 1740, it is the distinction between the Mitnagdim and the Hasidim. The Hasidim are the followers of a spiritualist and charismatic movement that began in Poland (Galicia), in reaction to the elitism of the traditional Judaism where studying was dedicated to one restricted intellectual minority.
And Mitnagdim Jews are opposed to the practices of Hasidim and maintained instead a strict intellectual elitism: only the best students have the privilege to spend their lifetime studying with the Rosh Yeshiva. They also prefer rational studying to the mysticism praised by the hasidic movement. Today differences are still obvious in the different ways they get dress: some Hasidic Jews are still wearing long peot and stramels, whereas the Mitnagdim prefer strict black suits. However the ideological divergences are no longer crucial: both Mitnagdim and Hasidim became allies in contra assimilation campaign that sought to stop the erosion of traditional Judaism.
Nowadays, differences are much more accurate in terms of political behaviour, for example, between those who accept the concept of Zionism, and those who are aggressively anti Zionists, there is a huge divergence. The most striking example of a violent anti-Zionist group is the Neturei Karta one. Since 1939, they have fought against the Zionist organisations. After the establishment of the State, they refused to be conscripted in the universal draft, refused to accept Israeli identity cards, and even manifested calling the Jews to surrender to the Arab armies. On the opposite, most of the Haredim do recognise the State of Israel and try to have an greater impact on in. Most of the Haredim were as their first representative party: Agoudat Israel, a Zionists. This meant that it did not embrace completely Zionism, because it did not share its vision of a State, but were not ready to be aggressively anti Zionist. The Haredim treated the Israeli government as they had treated the Polish or the Lithuanian ones, with respect of its power and with interests in safeguarding the religious Jews concerns. So, Agoudat Israel accepted the concept of living “ in exile among Jews” (Michel Freidman Religious fundamentalism and religious Jews). Nowadays, one of the main criteria of differentiation among Haredim in Israel is their degree of openness towards Zionism, and towards the secular world. It is important to notice that since the beginning of the second Intifada, the Haredim seem to feel more concerned about the future of the Israeli State. Some even speak of a “zionisation” of the Haredi population, an example could be the new policy of the Habad, a Hasidic group that now calls for defending the State of Israel. This behaviour seems far from the traditional distrust the Haredim nourished for the Israeli secular state. Indeed, the very principle of introducing the will of men in the Jewish history was seen as a rebellion against God. The Diaspora was considered as a punishment from God, and only God could deliver the Jews from the persecutions they underwent in the Diaspora.
The other criterion of differentiation is the one that exists between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. Sometimes called Sephardim and other times, Edot Hamizrach (minorities from the east), the Jews from Muslim countries arrived in Israel in masses since 1950. The Haredim among them differed a lot from the Ashkenazi ones, first of all, they were neither Hasidim nor Mitnagdim. They did not fight acculturation because most of the Sephardim did not reject religion like some Ashkenazim did, in general, they were traditionalists and always kept a emotionally attachment to tradition. So, at first, because their Judaism was not close to Hasidim, when arrived in Israel, most of the very religious Sephardim were absorbed into Mitnagdi-Lithunian style yeshivot. This kind of “assimilation” in the Ashkenazi world has stopped since 1977, when Likud won the elections with a large number a votes from the Sephardim. The rise of Sephardic power under the Likud government and at the initiation of famous rabbis like Rabbis Yosef and Schach, the religious among Sephardim formed a new organization: Shas Torah Guardians. Shas has also a deep difference with the Ashkenazi Haredim in its behaviour towards Zionism and towards Israel. First of all, a lot of the Shas supporters are acculturated Jews, therefore Shas could not be as radical as was Agoudat Israel, in terms of Jewish legislation, as a Chief Rabbi, rav Ovadia Yosef had been a functionary of the Zionist State, and a lot a the Shas voters served in the army. The typology set forth by Max Weber and the distinction made between 'sect' and 'church' has been adopted as a key tool in this respect, with scholars underscoring the comprehensive character of Shas as a "church," in comparison with the cloistered "sect"-like character of Ashkenazi haredi society (Fisher 1999; Fisher and Beckerman 2001). In short, the Haredi world id since then, split in into Hasidim, Mitnagdim and Sephardim.
We just studied the diversity of the Haredi world, its burdens, and its divergences. We will now try to focus on their common features in terms of organization, way of life, and mentality.
What is shared by the Haredim is a certain way of life that has the same features (or almost) for every Haredi. First of all, a Haredi is living in a “society of scholars” (M. Friedman, The ultra orthodox and the Israeli society). The Haredim have an wholly separate educational system that corresponds to its values: it separates boys and girls, privileges the teaching of religious matters, and offers different options for girls and boys. For a Haredi boy, the most prestigious “carrier” is to spend his lifetime studying in a yeshiva, this involves that on the other side, a good wife would try to respond to their family needs so that her husband can still study and does not need to work. This social organization is very recent and has been developed only thanks to the Israeli context. In Israel, the Haredi educational system is financed almost entirely by the State, and this enables the system to expand a lot. The exemption of the military draft permitted also the development of a yeshiva system that was in charge of the young haredim, from their early adolescence to their marriage, or even after, without interruption. The coming out if a “society of scholars” began in the late 1950s. Under the influence of a famous rabbi, rav A.I Karelitz, young men sought to show their devotion to torah study by continuing their studies after marriage in a post yeshiva institution called Kollel. Before that time the kollel was reserved to a minority of very brilliant students, and it was not a significant factor in the Haredi world. Under the economic and social circumstances prevailing after the establishment of the Israeli Sate, it has became a norm: kollel students wives could work ( mainly as teachers), and be the breadwinners of the family, the studies were free, and a lot of Jews from the Diaspora gave support to the new kollelim. By the mid 1960, the kollel opened its doors to all yeshiva students, not only to the best of them. The yeshivot, too, took all the Haredi younger generation. This is a major change within the Haredi community, it is even a social change without any parallel in the whole Jewish history. The Haredi society had become a society of scholars. This dramatic change has led to majors consequence in terms of social integration. First of all, it has separates totally the Haredi youth from the non Haredi society ( the young Haredim do not frequent the workplace anymore). Secondly, it gave the Haredi women the opportunity to play a key role in their family and community. They are responsible economically and socially of their family. Paradoxically, it is the sign tasks sharing and equality between men and women, concepts that are unknown in that traditional society. More and more young harediot have to study in a more open environment to get a job, they are a factor of openness to the exterior world, in fact they have more contacts with it, than their husbands.
One other common feature to all Haredim is the early age of marriage ( 19-22 for men, 18-21 for women), this has many implications in their way of life. First of all, they have children very early, generally during the first year of marriage, the new family is totally dependent on their extended families, who are obliged to purchase a home and supply their basic needs. Against the modern crisis of loneliness and individualism, the Haredi society developed the values of mutual assistance, concern for weaker members. In Israel, within the crisis of Zionism, the loss of idealism among the young generations, the Haredim felt a sense of victory upon the secular Zionism. This change in the way Israelis perceived the Haredi world led to a new trend: secular people, especially among the young began to become Haredim. The Haredim existences was no longer an aberration of history, on the contrary, their way of life was often seen as alternative to permissive Western culture. Not only do we perceive a change in the representation people have of the Haredim, but there is also a deep transformation in the way the Haredim act in the Israeli society.
We will try to explain how the Eda haredit moved from an a Zionist position, to a participation in the Israeli political life. To what extent do the Haredim influence the political and social life in Israel? How their participation to society is perceived by the secular people? How do the Haredim justify their engagement in a non Halakhic State?
After the obtaining of the “statu quo” laws, in 1950, the Agoudat Israel, the Haredi party chose to stay in the opposition for more than twenty years, its principal claims had been satisfied within the agreement with Ben Gourion called the “statu quo”. Within the statu quo they had agree on basic principles that guaranteed the coexistence between the Haredim and the rest of the population. The statu quo laws specified that the individual issues as marriage, burnings etc, would be took in charge by the religious authorities. The food in public institutions would be casher. And, the haredim in age to join the army would be exempted. This measure was unproblematic at that time, when the Haredim population was very small, today it is a very controversial issue. In 1952, the Agoudat Israel left the government because the Mapai refused to exempt all religious girls from the national service. Even outside of the government, Agouda deeply influence the Israeli society, the pressure it exerted upon the National Religious Party (NPR) made this party adopt stronger positions that it would have if it were on its own. During the first years of the State, the Haredim fought to grant a religious education to new immigrants, especially those coming from Islamic countries and who were traditionally close to religion. They also wanted to prohibit car traffic in their neighbourhoods.
Those conflicts made the Haredim understood one crucial lesson: they learned that in the Israeli democratic government, the power of the majority is limited when confronted to an opposing minority that wants to preserve its interests. Since the very first years of the Israeli State, the Haredim have fought for imposing their influence on specific issues: they have tried to spread the respect of Chabat, and the kasherout. They also had a great impact on the question “who is a Jew?”, and succeeded to promote a strict definition in accordance with the Jewish law. Their influence came to an apogee in 1977 when Menahem Begin won the elections. This was the beginning of what Ilan Greislammer called the “ golden age of religious parties”. They felt that Menahem Begin was closer to their definition of Judaism than the members of Mapai were. Indeed, Begin was a faithful man, using the vocabulary of religion in his speeches, he talked about ‘the Land of Israel” and used the expression “ with the help of God” etc. Begin respected a lot the sages of the Haredi world, furthermore, he needed their votes to get the majority, therefore, he made many promises to Agouda. This gave the Haredim the possibility to ask for more concessions. For instance they required the enactment of a law forbidding the sale of pork or the punishment against fraud concerning kosher products. Their most important combat, and their most controversial one among the Israeli society concerned the respect of the Shabat within the State institutions. They tried to push up their requirements further and further, but the confrontation with the secular society became more virulent. Two characteristic examples of the 1980s can be given of this confrontation. The first one began when the Agouda wanted to forbid the national company El Al to fly on Shabat, they obtained what they were asking for. But the secular population took it as a attempt to limit their individual rights. This feeling grew even bigger when the Haredim opposed to the openings of cinemas on Friday evenings. Violent manifestations occurred at this occasion showing how far both sides were able to go to defend their interests. However those confrontations also reveal that the Haredim cared a little of what was happening of the Israeli State. The emergence of new haredi political parties collecting many votes from non Haredim in the 1980s ( Shas in 1984, and Degel Hatorah in 1988) shows that they have managed to create organizations which are at the beginning meant to defend the Haredi community’s interests but finally even the non religious could identify to and trust as political entity (particularly true within Shas). This also shows the beginning of an opening to the society, and even to modernity that they have always rejected. Indeed, for their campaigns they use modern means of propaganda such as pamphlets, specialised newspapers, radio, and even television. This is quite paradoxical to think that the Haredim use modern tools of communication when they reject the very concept of modernity. Nowadays, religious parties are a major actors within the Israeli political life, no coalition can be done without their participation, and contrary to what they used to do at in the first years of the Israeli State, the Haredi parties also accept to held ministers.
Some signs of participation of the Haredim in the collective life of Israeli citizens can be seen in other fields than the political and religious ones. First of all, many Haredi movements have charity organizations, Shas and Chabad are very dynamic in helping the poor, providing them meals, organizing activities for handicapped people…Another significant example of this phenomenon is the creation a few years ago of the Zaka organization. Zaka is a religious organization that intervenes in events such as terrorist bombings, or natural catastrophes. Their mission is to collect the dead bodies of the victims, sometimes in pieces, in order to help identifying them and burying them properly, according to the Jewish law. The organization mainly works in Israel, but also sent some volunteers to other places in the world if something happens. For instance, about fifteen of them were sent to New York after September 11th, some volunteers were also sent to Istanbul a couple of weeks ago after the terror attacks against synagogues. Zaka was founded by a Haredi man, and is composed almost entirely of ultra orthodox Jews.
Now, it is crucial to tackle the issue of haw the Haredi participation in society is perceived by the secular people in Israel. A social group is also defined by the way it is appreciated by society.
For long time, the Haredim have been perceived as a parasites who take benefit from what the Israeli society could grant them, without belonging or participating to this society.
The problem of the army exemption became crucial with the demographic increase of the haredi population. To illustrate this growth of the Haredi population, Ilan Greilsammer took for example the Haredim in Bne Brak: in 1948, they were 9 300, in 1988, 109 000! They represent today 10% of the Jewish population in Israel. As the Haredi community expand and grow, it is a huge part of the population that is now exempted from the army. This makes the feeling of unfairness even more accurate within the rest of the Israeli population. Moreover, the increase in number of yeshiva and kollel students, the expansion of Haredi institutions and the pressure that Haredi politicians have applied to increase the state allocations for the society of scholars has intensified the hostility felt towards Haredim by the Israeli society in general. Demands that the Israeli politics free itself from the influence of the Haredi parties are voiced with increased frequency. The relative success of the secular party Shinui in last elections illustrate this phenomenon: part of the Israelis feel threatened by the growing influence of Haredi parties.
There is a kind of litany against the Haredim : they would despise the secular society, would pay no taxes, would not work at all. Part of those stereotype accusations are built upon real facts, but they are of course exaggerate and distorted. As we have already mentioned, it can not be asserted that Haredim do not work: women do work from their twenty years old, and man start working globally, when they are 28-30 years old, when they already have numerous children and cannot study all day, whether because they have not the abilities or because they need money for supporting their families. What is true is that the job they work in is a simple job, that does not require academic or professional background. They work for providing their basic needs and do not produce a lot of money on the scale of the Israeli economy. But they do work.
Another criticism is the claim that Haredim pay no taxes. Half of all tax revenues come from VAT collections. Haredim pay VAT like everyone else. And like everyone else, they make national insurance payments. Half of the adult population of Israel pays no income taxes, either because they earn too little or nothing at all. Haredim may be disproportionately found in this group, but they constitute only a small fraction of those who do not pay taxes. What about the charge that Haredim contribute nothing economically to Israel? That is not even true of the yeshivot and kollels, whose purposes are purely non-economic. For every dollar paid by the State to students in kollel, for instance, another four to five dollars are raised abroad. All that foreign currency comes into Israel and is spent here. The 6,000 unmarried yeshiva students and seminary students studying annually in Israel represent another major influx of foreign currency into the country. Were Israel to cease being viewed as the centre of Torah learning worldwide this vast infusion of money into the country would come to an end. Without Haredi visitors, who keep coming regardless of the security situation, El Al and many Jerusalem hotels would have even greatest difficulties than they have now.
The stereotype representation a lot of secular people do have of Haredim, and reciprocally the fear that inspired the secular world to Haredim are just a result of ignorance. This ignorance seems now to threaten the unity of the Israeli society, as both sides are becoming more extremist and more demanding from the State. As a conclusion, we can quote the words of a Haredi journalist, about non religious Jews: “ We should not forget that we all were on the Sinai Mount and that se will one day all reunified”. Yated Neeman, 02/02/90.
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Emanuelle Girsowicz
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Nurit Stadler, Is profane work an obstacle to salvation. The case of Ultra Orthodox Jews in contemporary Israel.
Ilan Greislammer : Israel, les hommes en noir, 1991, Presses de la fondation nationale des Sciences politiques.
Menachem Friedman: The ultra orthodox and the Israeli society, article from Wither Israel? The domestic change, edited by Kyle and Peters.
Charles S. Liebman and E. Don Yehiya: Religion and Politics in Israel , Indiana University Press, 1984
Naomi Gutkind Golan The Heikhal cinema issue, article from Conflicts and accommodation between Jews in Israel, Religious and secular, edited by Charles S. Liebman, 1990, Jerusalem.
Claude Klein, Le caratère juif de l’Etat d’Israel , 1977, éditions Cujas, Paris.
Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman
Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The case of the Haredim
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