| The West Bank and Gaza: Israel’s options for peace,Report of the Jaffee Center Study Group |
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| 04-08-2004 | |
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The West Bank and Gaza: Israel’s options for peace
Report of the Jaffee Center Study Group, 1989
August 5th , 2004
The West Bank and Gaza Israel’s options for peace is a comprehensive effort to analyse the strategies available to Israel for dealing with the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies was established at Tel-Aviv University at the end of 1977. The objective of the Center is to contribute to the expansion of knowledge on strategic subjects and to promote public understanding on matters of national and international security.
You’ll find here what I hope is a concise synthesis of the main points raised in the issued document.
The sixth main Israeli’s options for peace
1) The Status Quo
The first option is for Israel to maintain the status quo. Since the absence of change in the legal and political status of the West Bank and Gaza allows the Israel Defence Forces’ disposition of forces to remain unchanged, Israel would continue to enjoy the strategic depth provided by the West Bank, with associated advantages for warfighting and deterrence. The status quo also allows Israel to await the appearance of desirable partners for peace, possibly with fewer concessions required.
Yet the likely growing radicalization of Palestinian Arabs and a possible intensification of the Intifada, radicalization among Israeli Arabs, an enhanced unilateral Palestinian state building effort in the West Bank and Gaza, an increasing likehood of deterioration in Israel’s relations with the Arab world, offset these advantages.
2) Autonomy
The second option is the establishment of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Two principal versions of this option are considered.
- the first is a narrow autonomy similar to that developed by Israel in the course of the Camp David autonomy talks that would be applied to all Arab residents of the two regions, but not to the land of those territories.
This option would enjoy wide domestic acceptance among Jews as well as Israeli Arabs. The security risks entailed in this option are minimal. But the Palestinians would reject this option, as long as a post-autonomy transition to sovereign independence were not agreed and specified in advance, as part of the autonomy agreement.
- The second variant is a deep autonomy offering the Palestinians extended self-rule control over all state lands non occupied by the Israel Defence Forces or by Jewish settlements, and joint control (with Israel) over water, customs and immigration of both Jews and Arabs. This option would not pose greater security threats to Israel, but opposition within Israel to an autonomy that comprised many elements of sovereignty could be considerable. Yet by the same token, a broader autonomy is unlikely to elicit greater Palestinian acceptance; for the Palestinians, the critical factor is not the extent of autonomous authority provided but whether they receive a prior commitment that will eventually, at an agreed date, lead to statehood.
3) Annexion
The third option is the annexion of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. In view of the presence of over 1.5 million Palestinians in the territories, Israel, assuming it wished to remain a Jewish-Zionist state, would have to either deny their political participatory rights, or eventually transfer most of them from the West Bank and Gaza to the Arab states.
Annexion is technically feasible; Israel requires no partners in order to carry it out. It offers Israel the ability to formalize its strategic presence throughout the Land of Israel, fulfilling the commitment of some Israelis to the concept of Greater Israel. But it presages a violent Palestinian reaction involving escalating and unrestrained terrorism.
4) A Palestinian State
The fourth option considered is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in most of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization would agree that settling most of the refugees in Arab states would solve the Palestinian refugee problem, and the Palestine Liberation Organization would cancel the Palestinians claim to the right of return. Security provisions for Israel would include demilitarisation of the territories, alterations to the pre-1967 borders, and the deployment of limited Israeli forces. The two countries would collaborate on sensitive issues of mutual importance such as internal security and counter-terrorism, and disposition of water resources.
The creation of an independent Palestinian state offers a greater possibility of resolving the Palestinian issue on terms acceptable to the Palestinians than does any option considered.
But it entails serious risk for Israel: it involves a danger that, in the long term, the Palestinian state would attempt to realize the Palestinians aspirations for Greater Palestine by terrorism, subversion and/or by catalysing an Arab war coalition against Israel. Therefore, it is unlikely that an Israeli government would contemplate its negotiation and implementation.
5) Gaza Withdrawal
The fifth option is a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from most of the Gaza strip. The withdrawal would be followed by a complete severance of ties, including, possibly, a hermetic sealing of the border between Israel and the Strip. In order to prevent terrorist infiltration from Gaza and ensure Israel’s security, the border would be fenced.
This option would encounter limited Israeli domestic opposition, and is likely to be acceptable to Israeli Arabs as well. Yet Israeli unilateral withdrawal is likely to be perceived as a retreat, and an abdication by Israel of its responsibilities, in the face of cumulative Palestinian pressure.
Hence it might result in some loss of Israeli deterrence, thereby producing increased unrest among Palestinians elsewhere. In addition, the option would amount to the creation of a Palestinian mini-state that would constitute a precedent-setting realization of the Palestinian state ideal and would receive international recognition, yet would owe Israel nothing in return through negotiations or agreements.
Overall, this appears to be a risky option.
6) Jordanian-Palestinian Federation
The sixth option considered is the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation in most of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Jordan would be predominant in such federation, with responsibility for defence, internal security and foreign affairs resting in Amman. Most important among these measures would be the complete demilitarisation of the West Bank.
Jordan and Israel would share number of strategic interests that contribute to peace and stability, such as resettlement of the Palestinian refugees.
Yet this “Jordanian option” is unacceptable to most of the Palestinians. Since the Palestinians believe that they can achieve sovereign independence, they would oppose implementation of this option, employing terrorism against Israeli and Jordanian targets.
Under existing conditions and in their present form, none of the options seems to offer a reasonable avenue for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. The unilateral options are feasible but could prove disastrous. The negotiated compromised options are totally unacceptable for one or both sides. Under these circumstances, Israel must, in the immediate term, cope with the satus quo and seek ways to ameliorate it. Otherwise it is liable to degenerate into a situation that produces international, regional and local pressures on Israel to accept a Palestinian state solution under disadvantageous conditions.
Laura Tolub |
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| Dernière mise à jour : ( 06-08-2005 ) |
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